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Abstract: Voting games with abstention are voting systems in which players can cast not only yes
and no vote, but are allowed to abstain. This paper centers on the structure of a class of complete
games with abstention. We obtain, a parameterization that can be useful for enumerating these
games, up to isomorphism. Indeed, any I-complete game is determined by a vector of matrices
with non-negative integers entries. It also allows us determining whether a complete game with
abstention is a strongly weighted (3,2) game or not, and for other purposes of interest in game
theory.
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1 Introduction
Simple games have been intensively used as models of collective choice and, especially, for situations
arising from political science. Many of these situations are described by weighted majority games,
the most interesting class of simple games. In a simple game, a single alternative, such as a bill or
an amendment, is pitted against the status quo, the players or voters vote in favor of the alternative
or against it and the motion is passed or not depending of the collective strength of members who
vote “”yes”.” The motion passes if and only if the set of all those who vote ”yes” is a winning
coalition. Abstention plays a key role in many of the real voting systems that have been modeled
by these games (such as the United Nations Security Council, or the United States federal system),
yet simple games, by their very definition, do not take the possibility of abstention into account;
those who do not vote “yes” are presumed to vote “no.” Felsenthal and Machover [6] define ternary
voting games (TVGs), a generalization of simple voting games. This class of games is a particular
case of the more general class of (j, k) games introduced by Freixas and Zwicker [11]. Taking j = 3
and k = 2 leads to (3, 2) games that are equivalent to TVGs. In either of these models of games,
abstention is treated as a level of approval intermediate to “yes” and “no”.
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Defining a simple game requires to list winning coalitions. The representation is rather simple
if it is a weighted game, but many decisions rules do not admit such a representation. A charac-
terization of games that admit a representation as weighted game is due to Taylor and Zwicker
[21] (see [22] for a complete description of weighted games and related games). Looking for a more
convenient representation is another motivation of the work by Carreras and Freixas [3]. Since
completeness is a necessary condition for a simple game to be representable as a weighted game,
they argued that complete games constitute a natural framework for discussing the characteriza-
tion of weighted voting. This paper deals with the class of complete simple games and centers on
their structure. These authors showed that a complete simple game is determined uniquely, up
to isomorphism, by a vector with positive integers components and a matrix with non-negative
integers entries. Clearly, this is simpler and more intuitive than setting all the winning coalitions
of the game. The present paper is a generalization of the former to simple games with abstention
or (3,2) simple games. We obtain in this larger class of vote a similar result as that by Carreras
and Freixas [3].
Our results allow us to obtain some enumerations of I-complete (3,2) games. They also allow
us to simplify the task to determine whether a given I-complete (3, 2) game is strongly weighted
or not. This is a very important step for the resolution of voting game design problems, one of
which is the well known inverse problem, (see Alon and Edelman [1], Kurz [15] and Dragan [5]). In
this sort of problem, we look for a weighted voting game that minimizes the distance between the
distribution of power 1 among the players and a given target distribution of power (according to
a given distance measure). In [14], Keijzer et al provide algorithms that solve voting game design
problems by enumerating all games of interest. The algorithm has been improved in the subclass
of weighted games. Our result is a preparation for the extension of the work by Keijzer et al [14],
to voting games with abstention.
The enumeration of I-complete (3,2) games we obtain is very restrictive. Indeed, unlike Kurz
and Tautenhahn [16] who describe an approach to determine enumeration formulas for the number
of complete simple games, as for I-complete (3,2) games, we are able to achieve this only for very
small values of n the number of players. The parameterization for I-complete (3,2) games we obtain
in this paper combined with the application of some enumerating techniques may potentially serve
for achieving further enumerations of I-complete (3,2) games and strongly weighted games.
In order to achieve the results mentioned above, we follow the same methodology as Carreras
and Freixas [3]. The main tool used in this paper is the desirability relation introduced by Isbell
[13]. We consider the natural extension of this relation in (3, 2) games, introduced by Tchantcho et
al [23] and reconsidered in Pongou et al [19] and Freixas et al ([9], [10]). This extension is termed
influence relation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall basic definitions on (3, 2)
games. We also extend the well known influence relation introduced by Tchantcho et al [23] to
tripartitions and provide a characterization of indifference classes. In Section 3, we associate with
any complete (3, 2) game a multilattice of tripartition models which are represented by matrices
since they are clearly easier to manipulate. The main result is presented in Section 4 in which
we show that any (3, 2) complete game is characterized, up to an isomorphism by a vector of
1See [7] for a full description on power measurement problem.
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matrices, entries of which are non-negative integers. Such a representation is clearly simpler and
more intuitive than enumerating all the winning tripartitions of the game. We apply it to the
United Nations Security Council and show that this game is strongly weighted. Section 5 discusses
our results and concludes the paper. All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries : (3,2) simple games
The materials on this section are essentially taken from Freixas and Zwicker [11], Tchantcho et al
[23] and Freixas et al ([9], [10]). In [11], Freixas and Zwicker introduced (j, k) simple games, we
consider the particular case where j = 3 and k = 2. Before the main notions are introduced we
need some preliminary definitions.
Throughout the paper, N denotes the non-empty and finite set of voters or players. An ordered
tripartition of N is a sequence S = (S1, S2, S3) of mutually disjoint subsets of N whose union is
N . In S, S1 stands for the set of yes voters, S2 for abstainers and S3 stands for no voters. We
denote by 2N the set of all subsets of N or the set of all ordered bipartitions of N and by 3N the
set of all ordered tripartitions of N . For any subset C of N and any a ∈ N , we simply write C ∪ a
for C ∪ {a} while C \ a stands for C \ {a}. For S, S ′ ∈ 3N we write S ⊆3 S ′ to mean that either
S = S ′ or S may be transformed into S ′ by shifting 1 or more voters to higher levels of approval.
Formally S ⊆3 S ′ ⇔ S1 ⊆ S ′1 and S2 ⊆ S ′1 ∪ S ′2; we write S ⊂3 S ′ if S ⊆3 S ′ and S 6= S ′.
The ⊆3 order defined in 3N has minimum: the tripartition (∅, ∅, N), and maximum: the tripartition
(N, ∅, ∅). Hence for every tripartition S, (∅, ∅, N) ⊆3 S ⊆3 (N, ∅, ∅).
Definition 2.1 A simple game (or (2,2) game) is a pair (N, V ) where N is the non-empty but
finite set of voters and V is a value function defined from 2N to {0, 1} such that for all coalitions
C,C ′, if C ⊂ C ′ then V (C) = 1 implies V (C ′) = 1.
It is often demanded that V be exhaustive, which leads to V (∅) = 0 and V (N) = 1.
Definition 2.2 A (3, 2) game G = (N, V ) consists of a finite set N of voters together with a value
function V : 3N −→ {0, 1} such that for all ordered tripartitions S, S ′, if S ⊂3 S ′ then V (S) = 1
implies V (S ′) = 1.
A tripartition S such that V (S) = 1 is said to be winning. A (3, 2) game can be defined by
its set of winning tripartitions, W = {S ∈ 3N : V (S) = 1}. In that case we denote the game
by (N,W). In voting, it is often demanded that V be exhaustive, then from the monotonicity
demanded to V , V (∅, ∅, N) = 0 and V (N, ∅, ∅) = 1. This enable us to obtain the equivalent
definition below.
Definition 2.3 A (3,2) game G = (N,W) consists of a finite set N of voters together with a set
W verifying the following conditions:
• (∅, ∅, N) /∈ W,
• (N, ∅, ∅) ∈ W,
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• If S ⊂3 T and S ∈ W then T ∈ W (monotonicity).
Standard notions on simple games naturally extend for tripartitions in (3, 2) games : S is a
losing tripartition whenever S /∈ W , S is a minimal winning tripartition provided that S ∈ W
and for all T ∈ 3N such that T ⊂3 S, T /∈ W . Let Wm denote the set of minimal winning
tripartitions. It is clear that W or Wm uniquely determine the (3, 2) game. Similarly, S is a
maximal losing tripartition if S /∈ W and for all T such that S ⊂3 T , T ∈ W . Furthermore, L or
LM uniquely determine the (3, 2) game, where L is the set of losing tripartitions and LM the set
of maximal losing tripartitions. Anonymous (3, 2) games are games for which for all tripartition
S, S is winning if and only if for all permutation ϕ : N → N , ϕ(S) = (ϕ(S1), ϕ(S2), ϕ(S3)) is
winning.
Next, we introduce weighted (3, 2) games, which is a special type of weighted (j, k) games
introduced in [11].
Definition 2.4 Let G = (N,W) be a (3,2) game. A representation of G as a weighted (3,2) game
consists of a vector w = (w1, w2, w3) where wi : N → R for each i together with a real number






w1(a) ≥ w2(a) ≥ w3(a) for each a ∈ N .
We say that G = (N,W) is a weighted (3,2) game if it has such a representation.
According to the definition above, we can normalize, i.e. assign a zero weight, to any level of
approval. Here we are mainly concerned with games with abstention for which we can normalize the
weights at any of the three input levels, but it seems to be quite natural to choose the “abstention”
level . If a null weight is assigned to abstainers, then a non-negative weight is assigned to “yes”
voters and a non-positive weight to “no” voters. Thus, a weight 2 w(a) = (w+(a), 0, w−(a)) with
w+(a) ≥ 0 and w−(a) ≤ 0 is assigned to each a ∈ N . The only requirement for the threshold q, if
the (3, 2) game is demanded to be exhaustive, is that:
w(∅, ∅, N) =
∑
a∈N
w−(a) < q ≤
∑
a∈N
w+(a) = w(N, ∅, ∅).
The previous definition can now be rewritten as follows : G is weighted if there exists a sequence
of weight functions (w+, 0, w−) with w−(a) ≤ 0 ≤ w+(a) for all a ∈ N , and a quota q such that







Two consecutive stronger conditions of a weighted (3, 2) game are the following which were
introduced in Freixas and Zwicker [11]:
Definition 2.5 A strongly weighted (3, 2) game is a weighted (3, 2) game that admits a represen-
tation such that for every pair of voters a and b,
[w+(a) ≥ w+(b),−w−(a) ≥ −w−(b)] or [w+(a) ≤ w+(b),−w−(a) ≤ −w−(b)].
The influence relation defined in simple games were extended to (3,2) games by Tchantcho et
al [23] as follows.
2We are identifying w+ with w1, 0 with w2 and w
− with w3 in Definition 2.4.
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Definition 2.6 Let G = (N,W) be a (3, 2) game, a, b ∈ N :
• a is said to be at least as influential as b, denoted a ≥I b, if a ≥D+ b, a ≥D− b and a ≥D± b
where :
1) D+-desirability : for all (S1, S2, S3) ∈ 3N such that a, b ∈ S2,
(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W ⇒ (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W
2) D−-desirability: for all (S1, S2, S3) ∈ 3N such that a, b ∈ S3,
(S1, S2 ∪ b, S3 \ b) ∈ W ⇒ (S1, S2 ∪ b, S3 \ b) ∈ W
3) D±-desirability: for all (S1, S2, S3) ∈ 3N such that a, b ∈ S3,
(S1 ∪ b, S2, S3 \ b) ∈ W ⇒ (S1 ∪ a, S2, S3 \ a) ∈ W
• a is said to be strictly more influential than b, denoted a >I b if a ≥D+ b, a ≥D− b, a ≥D± b
and at least one of the three relations is strict.
• a is said to be as influential as b, denoted a ≡I b if a ≥I b and b ≥I a. In this case, players
a and b are said to be I-equivalent.
• G is a I-complete (3,2) game if either a ≥I b or b ≥I b for all pair a, b ∈ N .
It is straightforward to check that ≡I is an equivalence relation on N . In the sequel, the
equivalence classes will be denoted by N1, N2, . . . , Nt; the quotient set for ≡I is then denoted and
given by N/≡I = {N1, . . . , Nt}. That is, a ≡I b if and only if a and b belong to the same
equivalence class. Furthermore, >I induces a ranking I on the set of ≡I-classes. If a >I b,
a ∈ Nu and b ∈ Nv then Nu I Nv and we convey u < v.
The I-influence relation, which is reflexive is neither complete nor transitive in general. How-
ever, it has been proved in [23] that it is transitive whenever it is I-complete. Particularly, in
I-complete games, the influence relation is a complete preorder on the set of voters.
We illustrate the I-influence relation through the following example that will be very useful in
the sequel. From now on we will refer as n the vector defined by : n = (n1, n2, ..., nt) where for all
i = 1, ..., t, ni = |Ni|. In I-complete (3,2) games, we have : N1 I N2 I · · · I Nt.
Example 2.7 Let us consider the 4-player game defined by : N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
Wm =
{
(12, 3, 4), (12, 4, 3), (13, 2, 4), (14, 2, 3), (23, 1, 4),
(24, 1, 3), (23, 4, 1), (13, 4, 2), (14, 3, 2), (24, 3, 1)
}
where for instance, 12 represents {1, 2}.
The game is I-complete and there are two equivalence classes: the highest is N1 = {1, 2} and
the other class is N2 = {3, 4}. More precisely, we have : 1 ≡I 2 >I 3 ≡I 4 or equivalently
N1 I N2.
It is well known that in (2, 2) games, weighted games are complete and there exist, when n ≥ 6,
complete games that are not weighted. Unlike in the (2, 2) simple games, a weighted (3, 2) game
may not be I-complete. As well, I-completeness does not imply weightedness. However, if a (3, 2)
game is strongly weighted then it is I-complete but the converse is not true. Although for n = 2,
I-completeness implies strongly weightedness. When n > 2, one may find for every n an I-complete
game not being strongly weighted, see Freixas et al [9] for these known results.
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We recall below the definition of transposition operation of two players within a given tripar-
tition. Given a tripartition S = (S1, S2, S3) of N and two players a and b, πab(S) is defined by :
πab(S) = (πab(S1), πab(S2), πab(S3)) where for any coalition C of N ,
πab(C) =

C if {a, b} ∩ C = ∅ or {a, b} ⊆ C
(C \ a) ∪ b if a ∈ C and b /∈ C
(C \ b) ∪ a if a /∈ C and b ∈ C
The following definition will be useful in the sequel.
Definition 2.8 Let G = (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game. A tripartition S is said to be
shift-minimal winning if : S is winning and πab(S) is losing for all a ∈ Si, b ∈ Sj, i < j and
a >I b. The set of shift-minimal winning tripartitions is denoted by Wsm.
As in simple games, for any (3, 2) game (N,W) it is straightforward to see that Wsm ⊆ Wm ⊆
W and these inclusions can be strict.
In the sequel we would like to extend relations ≥I and ≡I which are defined on the set of
players to the set of tripartitions. Given two tripartitions S and T , consider the following binary
relations on 3N .
• T ⊥ S means that there exist a, b ∈ N with a ≡I b such that πab(S) = T ;
• T a S means that either S ⊆3 T or there exist two players a and b such that a ≥I b, a ∈ Sj,
b ∈ Si with i ≤ j and πab(S) ⊆3 T .
Definition 2.9 Let G be an I-complete (3,2) game, S, T ∈ 3N , then :
• S is said to be equivalent to T denoted S ∼I T if S ⊥ R1 ⊥ · · · ⊥ Rh = T for some integer
number h.
• T is said to dominate S denoted T %I S if T a Rh a · · · a R1 = S for some integer number
h.
It can be easily checked that ∼I is an equivalence relation on 3N . Furthermore, %I is a
preordering in the set 3N with ∼I as associated equivalence relation.
Proposition 2.10 For all S, T ∈ 3N , T ∼I S if and only if T %I S and S %I T .
In the sequel, the ∼I-class of a tripartition S ∈ 3N will be denoted by S.
Proposition 2.11 Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) simple game, N1, . . . , Nt, be the equivalence
classes of ≡I , with ni = |Ni| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Then,
1) for all R, S ∈ 3N , S ∼I R⇔ |Ni ∩ Sj| = |Ni ∩Rj| for all i = 1, 2, ..., t and all j = 1, 2, 3.
2-a) for all R, S ∈ 3N , if S = R then s = r where s = (si,j) and r = (ri,j) for all i = 1, ..., t
and all j = 1, 2, 3, with si,j = |Ni ∩ Sj|; furthermore, 0 ≤ si,j and
3∑
j=1
si,j = ni for all i = 1, 2, ..., t.
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2-b) Conversely, for any matrix s = (si,j)i=1,...,t
j=1,2,3
such that: 0 ≤ si,j and
3∑
j=1
si,j = ni for all
i = 1, ..., t defines a unique ∼I-class S ∈ 3N .






In the sequel, we shall call s = (si,j)i=1,...,t
j=1,2,3
the matrix of indices associated with the class S :
it provides the common model, in terms of equivalent players of all tripartitions belonging to S.
3 The multilattice associated with an I-complete (3,2) game
It is clearly easier to manipulate models that are represented by matrices s = (si,j) rather than
tripartitions themselves. Given an I-complete (3,2) game (N,W), we recall the notation n =
(n1, . . . , nt) and denote by Λ(W) the set of all admissible models of tripartitions of the game, that
is, Λ(W) = {s = (si,j) : 0 ≤ si,j and
3∑
j=1
si,j = ni for all i = 1, ..., t} and W = {S ∈ 3N : S ∈ W}
be the set of classes of winning tripartitions.
We shall define a (dominance) relation in the set of Λ(W) in the spirit of Carreras and Freixas
[3]. For this purpose, the following results are fundamental.
Proposition 3.1 Let G = (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game. If S ∈ W, a >I b, a ∈ Sj, b ∈ Si
with i < j, then πab(S) ∈ W.
Let G = (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game and assume that G is not anonymous, which
implies that t ≥ 2 that is, it has at least two types of equivalent players. Let s = (si,j) be an
element of Λ(W). For any fixed i′, i′′, j′, j′′ such that 1 ≤ i′ < i′′ ≤ t and 1 ≤ j′ < j′′ ≤ 3, we
define (when possible) the following matrix s′ = (s′i,j) where
s′i,j =

si,j + 1 if i = i
′ and j = j′
si,j − 1 if i = i′ and j = j′′
si,j − 1 if i = i′′ and j = j′
si,j + 1 if i = i
′′ and j = j′′
si,j otherwise







for i′ = 1, i′′ = 2 and j′ = 1, j′′ = 3 then we have s′ =
(
s1,1 + 1 s1,2 s1,3 − 1
s2,1 − 1 s2,2 s2,3 + 1
s3,1 s3,2 s3,3
)
From the proposition above, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 Let G = (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game. Let S be a tripartition represented
by a matrix s = (si,j). Let i
′, i′′, j′, j′′ with 1 ≤ i′ < i′′ ≤ t and 1 ≤ j′ < j′′ ≤ 3 such that the
matrix s′ = (s′i,j) is well defined.
If S ∈ W then S ′ ∈ W, for all tripartition S ′ represented by the matrix s′.
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Let S and S ′ be two tripartitions represented by the models s = (si,j) and s
′ = (s′i,j) respec-
tively :
• If S ⊂3 S ′ then we say that s′ is a monotonic shift of s.
• If there exist 1 ≤ i′ < i′′ ≤ t and 1 ≤ j′ < j′′ ≤ 3, such that s′i,j are all well-defined as above,
then we will say that s′ is an elementary positive shift of s. When necessary, we will say that
s′ is an elementary positive shift of s for rows (i′, i′′) and columns (j′, j′′).
• We will say that s′ dominates s in Λ(W) if s′ can be obtained from s by a sequence of
monotonic and/or elementary positive shifts.
We provide below an equivalent formulation for the dominance relation in the set Λ(W).
Definition 3.3 Given r = (ri,j), s = (si,j) ∈ Λ(W), we have s δ r if : σ(s) < σ(r) where



























and hence σ(s) < σ(r).










are not comparable by δ.
It is easy to check that δ is a partial ordering as stated below.
Proposition 3.4 The binary relation δ is a partial ordering on Λ(W).
We shall also note s = (s1, s2, s3) where any sj is the column number j of s. Given two column
vectors sj and rj for any j = 1, 2, 3 of s and r, we denote by:
sj δ
′ rj if Σi(sj) ≥ Σi(rj),∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t with Σi(sj) = s1,j + s2,j + · · ·+ si,j.
In words, sj δ
′ rj if for any row i, the sum of sj-components up to i is greater than or equal to the
corresponding sum of rj.
δ′ is an ordering that need not be complete.
Proposition 3.5 Given s, r ∈ Λ(W), the following two statements are equivalent:
• s δ r
•
{
either s1 = r1 and s2 δ
′ r2
or s1 6= r1 and (s1 δ′ r1 and (s1 + s2) δ′ (r1 + r2))
In the sequel we shall show that the pair (Λ(W), δ) is a multilattice that is, for all r, s ∈ Λ(W),
if we denote by Maj(r, s) the set of upper bounds of {s; r} and by Min(r, s) the set of lower
bounds of {s; r} then, both of those sets are non-empty with a minimal and maximal element
respectively.
For all matrices r, s ∈ Λ(W), define the following matrix u(r, s) or simply u as follows.
Definition of u given r, s ∈ Λ(W)
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Let r, s ∈ Λ(W) : Consider the following matrix M defined by:





′ defined as follows:
• M ′i,1 = Mi,1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t;
• M ′1,2 = M1,2 and
M ′i,2 =
{
Mi,1 +Mi−1,2 −Mi−1,1 if Mi,2 +Mi−1,1 −Mi,1 −Mi−1,2 < 0
Mi,2 otherwise
for all 1 < i ≤ t;
• M ′i,3 = Mi,3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
We define u = (ui,j) to be the matrix such that σ(u) = M
′, that is,
• u1,1 = M ′1,1 and ui,1 = M ′i,1 −M ′i−1,1 for all 1 < i ≤ t.
• u1,2 = M ′1,2 −M ′1,1 and ui,2 = M ′i,2 +M ′i−1,1 −M ′i−1,2 −M ′i,1 for all 1 < i ≤ t.
• ui,3 = ni − ui,1 − ui,2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
It is easy to check that u is an element of Λ(W). We state below that in general, u is minimal
in Maj(r, s) with Maj(r, s) = {v ∈ Λ(W) : v δ s and v δ r}.
Lemma 3.6 For all r, s ∈ Λ(W)
• u ∈Maj(r, s) and
• u is minimal in Maj(r, s).





We also consider the matrix m′ defined as follows:
• m′i,1 = mi,1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t;
• m′i,2 =
{
mi+1,2 +mi,1 −mi+1,1 if mi+1,2 +mi,1 −mi+1,1 −mi,2 < 0
mi,2 otherwise
for all 1 ≤ i < t and m′t,2 = mt,2;
• m′i,3 = mi,3 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Definition of d given r, s ∈ Λ(W)
The matrix d = (dij) such that σ(d) = m
′ is define as follows:
• d1,1 = m′1,1 and di,1 = m′i,1 −m′i−1,1 for all 1 < i ≤ t;
• d1,2 = m′1,2 −m′1,1 and di,2 = m′i,2 +m′i−1,1 −m′i,1 −m′i−1,2 for all 1 < i ≤ t; and
• di,3 = ni − di,1 − di,2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
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It is easy to check that d is an element of Λ(W). We state below that in general, d is maximal
in Min(r, s) with Min(r, s) = {v ∈ Λ(W) : s δ v and r δ v}.
Lemma 3.7 For all r, s ∈ Λ(W)
• d ∈Min(r, s) and
• d is maximal in Min(r, s).










are not comparable. Let us compute






































It can be easily seen in this example that u δ s and u δ r whereas s δ d and r δ d.
It follows from the lemmas above that (Λ(W), δ) is a multilattice. This will later be referred to
as the multilattice associated to the I-complete (3,2) game W . The maximum and the minimum















Example 3.8 The multilattice associated with the 4-player game considered in Example 2.7 is
shown in Figure 1.
As we can see, in the first example above there are only two equivalence classes for the I-influence
relation. In the following example in which the game has 3 equivalence classes, the construction
of the multilattice associated to this game becomes less obvious.
Example 3.9 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Wm = {(12, 3, 4), (13, 2, 4), (14, 2, 3), (12, 4, 3)}. The game
is I-complete with the following classes :
N1 = {1} I N2 = {2} I N3 = {3, 4}.
The multilattice associated with this I-complete game is given in Figure 2.
We conclude this section by showing that (Λ(W), δ) and (3N/∼I , I) are isomorphic, implying
in particular that any tripartition class S in 3N/∼I (where I is the dominance relation induced
on 3N/∼I by the dominance relation %I on 3N : that is S I R if and only if S %I R) can be
identified with a unique model s in Λ(W). In this respect we need a preliminary result.
Lemma 3.10 Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) simple game.
For all S,R ∈ 3N , if S a R then s δ r.
The mentioned result states as follows.
Theorem 3.11 Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) simple game and let N1 I N2 I · · · I Nt
be the linear ordering of the classes with respect to ≡I . Then the map
Φ : (3N/∼I , I) −→ (Λ(W), δ)
S 7−→ s = (si,j)i=1,...,t
j=1,2,3
is an isomorphism of ordered sets.
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4 Characteristic invariant of an I-complete (3,2) game
In this section we shall introduce a component that will allow us to classify and determine
I-complete (3,2) games. In order to achieve this, we need some additional notations and defi-
nitions.
Let (N,W) be a (3,2) game. We denote by :
• W = {S ∈ 3N : S ∈ W} the set of classes of winning tripartitions,
• Wm = {S ∈ 3N : S ∈ Wm} the set of classes of minimal winning tripartitions, and
• Wm = {S ∈ 3N : S ∈ Wsm} the set of classes of shift-minimal winning tripartitions.
Note that S ∈ W if and only if s δ r for some R ∈ Wsm. In other words,
W = {S ∈ 3N : S %I R for some R ∈ Wsm}.
The following proposition shows the inclusion relation of the sets W , Wm and Wm.
Proposition 4.1 Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game ; then, Wm ⊆ Wm ⊆ W.
We know that whenever R ⊂3 S, it follows that s δ r. We recall that N1 I N2 I · · · I Nt
is the strict linear ordering of classes according to the relation ≡I and n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) is the
vector defined by their cardinalities.
Without loss of the generality, we assume that there are r models associated to the different
classes of shift-minimal winning tripartitions. Let m1, m2, ... ,mr be these models (where mp =
(mpi,j)i=1,...,t
j=1,2,3
). Again, without loss of the generality we can assume that these models are ordered
lexicographically with respect to rows, as follows.
Given x and y two vectors of r components each, we say that x is lexicographically greater or
equal to y if x = y or (there exists h < r such that xu = yu for all u ≤ h and xh+1 > yh+1).
























As from now we will assume, without loss of the generality that these models are ordered
lexicographically and this leads to the sequence denoted M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mr). We provide
below some useful properties for M.
Theorem 4.2 Let G = (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) simple game. The vector M associated
with G satisfies the following properties :
1) 0 ≤ mpi,j and 0 <
3∑
j=1
mpi,j = ni for all p = 1, . . . , r and all i = 1, . . . , t where ni = |Ni| with
N1 I N2 I · · · I Nt are the I-classes of G;
2) If r > 1 then mp and mq are not δ-comparable if p 6= q; and
3) (i) If t = r = 1, then m11,3 < n;
(ii) If t > 1 then for every i < t there exists some p such that (mpi,1 > 0 and m
p
i+1,1 < ni+1) or




Condition (3) reflects that for every i < t, a ∈ Ni and b ∈ Ni+1, some tripartition witnesses
that b I a.
The next theorem shows that :
• The vector M is left invariant by any isomorphism of I-complete (3,2) games. We recall to
this end that two (3,2) games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic if there exists
a bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈ W if and only if f(S) ∈ W ′; f is called an
isomorphism of (3,2) games and is also denoted by f : (N,W)→ (N ′,W ′).
• The vector M determines the game, in the sense that we are able to define a (unique up to
isomorphism) I-complete (3,2) game that possesses this invariant.
• Thanks to the above points, and to the fact that the vectorM also allows us to classify the
game, i.e. to distinguish it from any other non-isomorphic game; we shall refer to M as the
characteristic invariant of the I -complete (3,2) game (N,W).
Theorem 4.3
(a) Two I-complete (3,2) games (N,W) and (N ′,W ′) are isomorphic if and only if M =M′.
(b) Given a vector M satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.2, there exists an I -complete (3,2)
game the characteristic invariant of which is M.
Now let us illustrate this result through examples.
Example 4.4





is an I-complete (3, 2) game with






minimal winning tripartitions. Thus, this game has 36 minimal winning tripartitions.
2) The voting procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization is described
as follows : N = N1 ∪N2 where N1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} represents the set of permanent members and
N2 = {6, 7, . . . , 15} the set of non permanent members, Wm = {(S1, S2, S3) ∈ 3N : |S1| = 9 and
































Note however that this game has 5005 shift-minimal winning tripartitions, and there are not
minimal winning tripartitions not being shift-minimal winning.













- The vector M satisfies the conditions in Theorem 4.2.
- We let N = {1, 2, . . . , 8} and form the classes: N1 = {1, 2, 3} > N2 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.






















Proposition 2.11, we determine how many tripartitions are associated with each model. We should
need 126 minimal winning tripartitions to describe the game (N,W) in classical form.
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Remark 4.5 : It is well known that for n = 2, there are exactly 12 I-complete (3,2) games. It is
also known that for t = 1 and n arbitrary there are 2n+1 − 2 I-complete (3,2) games (Freixas and
Zwicker [12]). The representation above allows us to compute, for n = 3, the number of I-complete
(3,2) games is 162. We have also computed the number of these games for n = 4, t = 2, 3 and
n = 5, t = 2. It is a challenging problem to obtain more enumerations for other combinations of
n and t. These numbers are depicted in the following table in terms of the number of I-classes
t = 1, 2, 3.
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
t = 1 2 6 14 30 62
t = 2 - 6 80 888 12752
t = 3 - - 68 7292 ?
t = 4 - - - ? ?
t = 5 - - - - ?
Table 1:
? means we are unable to enumerate and − non-possible combination for n and t. The previous
table does not contain the number of I-complete (3, 2) games for t = 4 and t = 5 if n ≤ 5 because
the computer wasn’t able to give us these numbers. It is an interesting computational problem
to obtain these numbers, which would allow to know the number of I-complete (3, 2) games up to
isomorphism for n ≤ 5. Of course, enumerations for other combinations of n and t are equally
interesting.
In the following part, we prove that the representation above is also useful for determining
whether a given I-complete (3, 2) game is strongly weighted or not. First, recall that any weighted
(3, 2) game can be represented as a normalized weighted (3, 2) game, that is, a weighted (3, 2)
game for which, for a, b ∈ N , a ≡I b if and only if w(a) = w(b) with w(a) = (w1(a), w2(a), w3(a))
and w1(a) ≥ w2(a) ≥ w3(a). Moreover, it is feasible to normalize by 0 at any level of approval.
As the intermediate level usually stand for abstention, we may assume w2(a) = 0 for all a ∈ N . A
strongly weighted (3,2) game is a weighted (3,2) game such that for every pair a, b ∈ N it yields
either [w1(a) ≥ w1(b) and w3(a) ≤ w3(b)] or [w1(b) ≥ w1(a) and w3(b) ≤ w3(a)]. We prove the
following result.
Proposition 4.6 Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) game.
(N,W) is a strongly weighted (3,2) game if and only if there is a vector w = (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(t)),
such that w(i) = (w1(i), w2(i), w3(i)) = (w1(i), 0, w3(i)) with w1(i) ≥ 0 ≥ w3(i) (i = 1, . . . , t) which





i ) · w(i) > 0 for p = 1, 2, . . . , r; q = 1, 2, . . . , s, where m1, . . . ,mr are the models
of shift-minimal winning tripartitions and α1, . . . , αs are those of shift-maximal losing tripartitions
and ”·” is the inner product.
The above result can be illustrated with the UNSC game. Recall that the UNSC voting rule is













































We note that, since there are 125 shift-maximal losing tripartitions and 5005 shift-minimal
winning ones, so a näıve attempt to study the weightedness of this game would lead to a system of
5005× 125 = 625625 inequalities with 30 unknowns. However, the result above allows us to solve





i ) ·w(i) > 0 for p = 1, 2, . . . , 6; q = 1, 2.
Solving these inequalities gives the following vectors of weights : (1, 0,−6) for a permanent member
and (1, 0, 0) for a non permanent, and the quota is q = 9.
5 Conclusion and future work
The main contribution of this paper was to provide a simpler and more intuitive representation
of a significant subclass of (3, 2) simple games, that of I-complete (3,2) games. Any such game
can be represented by a finite list of matrices with non negative entries fulfilling some simple
algebraic properties. We give some enumerations of I-complete (3,2) games for combinations of
the parameters n and t, where t is the number of equivalent classes on players. As a consequence
of our enumerations we know that there are 162 I-complete (3,2) games for n = 3, 8210 I-complete
(3,2) games for n = 4 with t ≤ 3 and 12814 I-complete (3,2) games for n = 5 and t ≤ 2. A
computer-savvy researcher should be able to obtain enumerations for other relatively combinations
of n and t, than those we obtained in the paper. We apply it to the United Nations Security Council
and show that this game is strongly weighted.
Many power indices for (3,2) games are easily computed in the class of weighted (3,2) games by
using generating functions, as shown in [8]. Thus, in this respect, it is very important to determine
if a given (3,2) game is weighted. If the (3,2) game is I-complete, then it could be (strongly)
weighted and proposition 4.6 gives us the answer. If the game is strongly weighted then it is easy,
by means of the generating function methods, as shown in Feixas et al [9], to compute some power
indices for a reasonable large number of players.
Many significant subclasses of I-complete (3,2) games are more easily tractable by using our
numerical parameterization. For instance, I-complete (3,2) games being either constant-sum games
or games with consensus or homogeneous are now susceptible of being studied, classified or enu-
merated. Herewith, we point out some possible lines of future research related to our work.
The starting point was the extension of the desirability relation defined on individuals to
coalitions. We used the I-influence relation defined by Tchantcho et al [23]. However, as raised in
Freixas et al [9], there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something
different to what occurs for simple games. This leads to the introduction of several extensions
of the desirability relation for simple games. From the completeness of these extensions, follows
the consistent link with weighted games. In a future work it could be interesting to analyze the
replacement of the I-influence used in this paper, with any of these extensions.
As pointed out above, we obtained some enumerations for I-complete (3,2) games for some
combinations of n and t. It seems computationally tractable to get enumerations for n = 4
and n = 5. It would be very interesting to get further enumerations for other combinations of
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these two parameters. Following Kurz and Tautenhahn [16], it would be interesting to find an
algorithm to determine formulas for the number of I-complete (3,2) games. Proposition 4.6 serves
for determining if a given I-complete (3,2) game is a strongly weighted (3,2) game. It is a challenging
question to determine the number of strongly weighted (3,2) games for small combinations of the
two parameters n and t.
We know that weighted (3,2) games can be written (in a suitable way) as a threshold function.
In this respect, one can wonder if the work by Bohossian and Bruck [2] who developed algebraic
techniques for constructing minimal weight threshold functions can be extended to (3,2) games
setup.
The notion of game with consensus has been extensively considered in the litterature (see Peleg
[18] and Carreras and Freixas [4]). These are game which are obtained by intersecting a linear game
with a symmetric weighted game. For example, Carreras and Freixas investigate the behaviour of
the Shapley-Shubik [20] power index when passing from one such game to another. The analogous
of these notions can be obtained for (3,2) games raising the problem of extension of the results
obtained in simple games to (3,2) games.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.10
⇒) S ⊥ T means that there exist a, b ∈ N such that πab(S) = T and a ≡I b (or, a ≥I b and
b ≥I a)
With no loss to generality, assume that a ∈ Si and b ∈ Sj with i ≤ j : then we have b ∈ Ti and
a ∈ Tj. Thus, (πab(S) = T, a ≥I b and a ∈ Ti, b ∈ Tj with i ≤ j) and (πab(T ) = S, b ≥I a and
b ∈ Si, a ∈ Sj with i ≤ j) and hence T a S and S a T .
⇐) Conversely, assume that S a T and T a S.
• If S = T then S ⊥ T .
• If S 6= T then : S a T and T a S means that:
- There exists {a, b} ⊆ N such that πab(T ) ⊆3 S, a ≥I b, and b ∈ Sj and a ∈ Si with i ≤ j
- There exists {a, b} ⊆ N such that πcd(S) ⊆3 T, c ≥I d, and d ∈ Tj and c ∈ Ti with i ≤ j.
We shall first prove that in this conditions, it holds (a, b) = (c, d).
Assume by contradiction that (a, b) 6= (c, d). We claim that |Sp| = |Tp| for all p = 1, 2, 3.
Indeed, assume that there exists p0 ∈ {1, 2, 3} such that |Sp0| 6= |Tp0|. With no loss to the
generality, assume that |Sp0| < |Tp0 |.
- If p0 = 1, then |S1| < |T1|, but πab(T ) ⊆3 S so, |T1| ≤ |S1| which is impossible.
- If p0 = 2, then |S2| < |T2|, but πcd(S) ⊆3 T so, |T1| ≥ |S1| and |T1 ∪ T2| ≥ |S1 ∪ S2| then
|T1 ∪ T2| = |T1|+ |T2| > |S1|+ |S2| = |S1 ∪ S2|. But πab(T ) ⊆3 S thus, |T1 ∪ T2| ≤ |S1 ∪ S2| which
is a contradiction.
- If p0 = 3 then |S3| < |T3|, but πcd(S) ⊆3 T so |S3| ≥ |T3| which is impossible.
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We can conclude at this point that |Sp| = |Tp| for all p ∈ {1, 2, 3} and hence
πab(Tp) = Sp and πcd(Sp) = Tp for all p = 1, 2, 3.
Since S 6= T , there exists p0 such that Sp0 6= Tp0 . Either (c /∈ Sp0 and d ∈ Sp0) or (d /∈ Sp0 and
c ∈ Sp0). With no loss of generality, assume that c /∈ Sp0 and d ∈ Sp0 . Then, πab(Tp0) = Sp0 and
πcd(Sp0) = Tp0 imply that πab(πcd(Sp0)) = Sp0 . As d ∈ Sp0 , it follows that c ∈ πcd(Sp0) and thus
c ∈ πab(πcd(Sp0)) = Sp0 , which is a contradiction, hence, (a, b) = (c, d).
As (a, b) = (c, d), we then have, (πab(T ) ⊆3 S, a ≥I b), and (πab(S) ⊆3 T, b ≥I a) so,
πab(T ) ⊆3 S and T ⊆3 πab(S) ⊆3 T : consequently, πab(S) = T , which together with a ≡I b yield
S ⊥ T . 
Proof of Proposition 2.11
Let (N,W) be an I-complete (3,2) simple game, N1, N2, . . . , Nt, be the equivalence classes of
≡I , with |Ni| = ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
1. ⇒) Since S ∼I R, R = f(S) with f : N → N a product of transpositions of equivalent
players; therefore f(Ni) = Ni for all i. It follows that for all j = 1, 2, 3 and for all i = 1, . . . , t,
Rj ∩Ni = f(Sj) ∩ f(Ni) = f(Sj ∩Ni) so, |Rj ∩Ni| = |Sj ∩Ni| for all i and all j because f
is bijective.
⇐) Conversely, assume that |Sj ∩ Ni| = |Rj ∩ Ni| for all j = 1, 2, 3 and all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., t}.
Let A = {j : Si = Rj} : then |A| ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
(a) If |A| ≥ 2 then it is obvious that S = R and it follows that S ∼I T .
(b) If |A| = 1 then assuming with no loss of the generality that S1 = R1, we have: S2 6= R2
and S3 6= R3.
It follows from |Sj∩Ni| = |Rj∩Ni| for all i, j that |S2|−|S2∩R2| = |R2|−|S2∩R2| and
|S3| − |S3 ∩R3| = |R3| − |S3 ∩R3|; thus, |S2 \R2| = |R2 \ S2| and |S3 \R3| = |R3 \ S3|.
Furthermore, we have :
For all i = 1, ..., t,
{
|(S2 \R2) ∩Ni| = |(R2 \ S2) ∩Ni|
|(S3 \R3) ∩Ni| = |(R3 \ S3) ∩Ni|
(∗)




((S2 \R2) ∩Ni)|+ |
t⋃
i=1












since |(S2 \R2) ∩Ni| = |(R2 \ S2) ∩Ni| for all i.
Now let m =
t∑
i=1
|(S2 \R2) ∩Ni| : m 6= 0 because S2 6= R2.
We shall now proceed by induction on m in order to ”transform” S into R .
Let a ∈ (S2 \ R2) ∩ Ni and b ∈ (R2 \ S2) ∩ Ni and let us consider the transposition








|(S ′2 \ R2) ∩ Ni| = m − 1 and by induction we obtain a sequence
(π(1), π(2), . . . , π(m)) of transpositions of equivalent players such that:
π(m) ◦ π(m−1) ◦ · · · ◦ π(1)(S2) = R2. We consider the application f : N → N which is the
product of the m transpositions of indifferent players that leads to : f(S2) = R2. We
then have: f(S) = (f(S1), f(S2), f(S3)) = (R1, R2, f(N \ (S1 ∪ S2))) = R and it follows
that S ∼I R.
(c) If |A| = 0 then Sj 6= Rj, for all j.
• Since S1 6= R1 we consider m =
t∑
i=1
|(S1 \ R1) ∩ Ni|. Using induction on n and a
similar proof to the one used in (1.b) we show that there exists a mapping g : N → N





S ∼I g(S). If g(S2) = R2 then g(S3) = R3 and it follows that g(S) = R and
hence S ∼I R. If g(S2) 6= R2, then g(S) = (R1, S ′2, S ′3) with S ′2 6= R2, that is
|{j : g(Sj) = Tj}| = 1.
• Note that g(S) satisfies (∗). We can now refer to (1.b) to deduce that g(S) ∼I R.
The conclusion S ∼I R then follows.
(d) The two equalities and the inequality are obvious.
(e) Any tripartition T of the ∼I-class S is obtained by choosing for every i, si,1 players in
Ni to form T1 and choosing for any i, si,2 players among the ni − si,1 remaining players
in Ni to form T2. The remaining players form T3.
2. This comes directly from the procedure above and merely states the number of ways S can
be formed. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider R the tripartition obtained from S by moving player b from the j-th level to the i-th
level. Then both a and b belong to Ri
If R is winning, then by monotonicity, πab(S) is winning.
If R is losing, as a >I b, we have a ≥D+ b, a ≥D− b and a ≥D± b.
If j = 1 and i = 2, a ≥D+ b implies that πab(S) is winning.
If j = 1 and i = 3, a ≥D± b implies that πab(S) is winning.
If j = 2 and i = 3, a ≥D− b implies that πab(S) is winning. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2
As s′ is well defined, si′,j′′ > 0 and si′′,j′ > 0. It follows that there exists a, b ∈ N such that,
a ∈ Sj′′ ∩ Ni′ and b ∈ Sj′ ∩ Ni′′ . We have a ∈ Ni′ and b ∈ Ni′′ with i′ < i′′ : thus a >I b. At the
same time a ∈ Sj′′ and b ∈ Sj′ with j′ < j′′ so it follows from Proposition 3.1 that πab(S) ∈ W ,




′ ∈ W . 
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Proof of Proposition 3.4
It is obvious that δ is reflexive and antisymmetric. Now let s, r and v ∈ Λ(W) such that: s δ r
and r δ v. It follows that, σsi,j ≥ σri,j ∀i, j and σri,j ≥ σvi,j ∀i, j, hence σsi,j ≥ σvi,j ∀i, j. Thus s δ v
and δ is an ordering on Λ(W).


























. Hence δ is a partial order. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5
(⇒) Let us suppose that for any two models s and r of Λ(W), σ(s) < σ(r). We shall prove
that: {
either s1 = r1 and s2 δ
′ r2
or s1 6= r1 and (s1 δ′ r1 and (s1 + s2) δ′ (r1 + r2))
σ(s) < σ(r) means that σsi,j ≥ σri,j ∀i, j.










si′,1 = Σi(s1). So, Σi(s1) ≥ Σi(r1) and hence s1 δ′ r1.
• If there exists a row i such that Σi(s1) > Σi(r1) then s1 6= r1.










si′,j′ = Σi(s1 + s2) hence, Σi(s1 + s2) = Σi(r1 + r2) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t and
thus (s1 + s2)δ
′(r1 + r2).
• If not, then s1 = r1 and using (?) we conclude that Σi(s1 + s2) ≥ Σi(r1 + r2) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
Since Σi(s1 + s2) = Σi(s1) + Σi(s2) we conclude that Σi(s2) ≥ Σi(r2) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t, that is,
s2 δ
′ r2.
⇐) Let us now suppose that for any two models s and r of Λ(W) we have:{
either s1 = r1 and s2 δ
′ r2
or s1 6= r1 and (s1 δ′ r1 and (s1 + s2) δ′ (r1 + r2))
We need to prove that σ(s) < σ(r).
• If s1 δ′ r1 and (s1 + s2) δ′ (r1 + r2) then we have, σsi,1 ≥ σri,1 and σsi,2 ≥ σri,2 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
Thanks to the equalities σsi,1 = Σi(s1) and σ
s
i,2 = Σi(s1 + s2) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t, we obtain
σsi,3 = Σi(s1 + s2 + s3) = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ ni = Σi(r1 + r2 + r3) = σri,3 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t.
Hence σsi,j ≥ σri,j ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t and j = 1, 2, 3.
18
• If s1 = r1 and s2 δ′ r2 it can easily be checked as well that σsi,j ≥ σri,j ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t and
j = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, we conclude that σ(s) < σ(r). 
Proof of Lemma 3.6
Let r, s ∈ Λ(W).
1. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ t and j = 1, 2, 3, σui,j = M ′i,j ≤ Mi,j = max(σri,j;σsi,j) ≥ σri,j, hence σ(u) < σ(r)
and thus u δ r. Likewise we have u δ s.
2. Next, consider v ∈ Λ(W) such that v ∈ Maj(s, r). We shall prove that if u δ v then v = u.
It is then useful to prove that v δ u. It follows from the definition of M ′ that M ′ < M and
for this purpose we will distinguish two cases.
• Case1 : M = M ′
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ t and j = 1, 2, 3 then σui,j = M ′i,j = Mi,j = max(σsi,j;σri,j) ≤ σvi,j since
v ∈Maj(s, r), hence v δ u and thus v = u.
• Case2 : M ′ <M and M ′ 6= M
It follows from v δ r and v δ s that σ(v) <M .
It follows from the definition of M ′ that there exists l, (1 < l ≤ t) such that M ′l,2 > Ml,2
and for all i, (1 ≤ i ≤ t) such that M ′i,j ≤Mi,j, we have M ′i,j = Mi,j for j = 1, 2, 3. For
such i, we have σvi,j ≤ σui,j = M ′i,j = Mi,j ≤ σvi,j hence σvi,j = Mi,j = σui,j.





l−1,1−σvl,1−σvl−1,2 < M ′l,2+Ml−1,1−Ml,1−Ml−1,2 = 0, since σvl,2 < σul,2 = M ′l,2.
Hence vl,2 < 0 which is impossible since v ∈ Λ(W). Therefore, σ(v) < σ(u) and thus
v δ u. 
Proof of Lemma 3.7
Let r, s ∈ Λ(W).
1. First let us show that s δ d and r δ d.
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ t and j = 1, 2, 3 then σdi,j = m′i,j ≤ mi,j = min(σsi,j;σri,j) ≤ σsi,j, hence σ(s) < σ(d)
and thus s δ d. Likewise we prove that r δ d.
2. Next, consider v ∈ Λ(W) such that v ∈ Min(s, r). We shall prove that if v δ d then v = d.
It’s then useful to prove that d δ v. It follows from the definition of m′ that m < m′ and for
this purpose we will distinguish two cases.
• Case1 : m = m′
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ t and j = 1, 2, 3 then σdi,j = m′i,j = mi,j = min(σsi,j;σri,j) ≥ σvi,j since
v ∈Min(s, r), hence d δ v and thus v = d.
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• Case2 : m < m′ and m 6= m′
It follows from r δ t and s δ t that m < σ(v).
It follows from the definition of m′ that there exists l, (1 ≤ l < t) such that m′l,2 < ml,2
and for all i, (1 ≤ i ≤ t) such that m′i,j ≥ mi,j, we have m′i,j = mi,j for j = 1, 2, 3. For
such i, we have σvi,j ≥ σdi,j = m′i,j = mi,j ≥ σvi,j hence σvi,j = mi,j = σdi,j.





l,1− σvl+1,1− σvl,2 < ml+1,2 +ml,1−ml+1,1−m′l,2 = 0, since σvl,2 > σdl,2 =
m′l,2. Hence vl+1,2 < 0 which is impossible since v ∈ Λ(W). Therefore, σ(d) < σ(v) and
thus d δ v. 
Proof of Lemma 3.10
It suffices to prove that for any S,R ∈ 3N if R ⊆3 S or there exists u, v ∈ N with u ∈ Sm, v ∈ Sl
with l ≤ m and u ≥I v, such that πuv(R) = S then s δ r.
If R ⊆3 S then R1 ⊆ S1 and R1 ∪R2 ⊆ S1 ∪ S2. It then follows that ri,1 ≤ si,1 and
ri,1 + ri,2 ≤ si,1 + si,2 ∀i = 1, . . . , t. This later inequality implies Σi(r1) ≤ Σi(s1) (i) and (s1 +
s2) δ
′ (r1 + r2). (ii)
• If s1 = r1 then ri,2 ≤ si,2 ∀i = 1, . . . , t, hence Σi(r2) ≤ Σi(s2) ∀i = 1, . . . , t and consequently
s2 δ
′ r2; thus, s δ r.
• If s1 6= r1 then s1 δ′ r1 from (i) and with (ii) we have s δ r.
If πuv(R) = S with u ≥I v , u ∈ Sm, v ∈ Sl and l ≤ m, let u ∈ Np and v ∈ Nq then p ≤ q since
u ≥I v.
• If l = m then s = r and s δ r.
• If l < m : on one hand, if p = q then s = r and thus s δ r. On the other hand, if p < q then
sp,l = rp,l + 1, sq,l = rq,l − 1, sp,m = rp,m − 1, sq,m = rq,m + 1, si,j = ri,j for all j 6= l,m and
all i 6= p, q. This means that s is an elementary positive shift of r and therefore, s δ r. 
Proof of Theorem 3.11
We need to prove that
Φ : (3N/∼I , I) −→ (Λ(W), δ)
S 7−→ s = (si,j)i=1,...,t
j=1,2,3
is an isomorphism of ordered
sets.
It follows from proposition 2.11 that Φ is well defined and bijective. Now, let S,R ∈ 3N : set
s = Φ(S) and r = Φ(R).
The implication S I R⇒ s δ r follows directly from the lemma above.
Now assume that s δ r : let us prove that S I R. In order to achieve this, we will construct
a matrix U such that S I U I R, that is, S %I U %I R.
As s δ r, we have:
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{
either s1 = r1 and s2 δ
′ r2
or s 6= r and (s1 δ r1 and Σi(s1 + s2) ≥ Σi(r1 + r2) ∀i = 1, 2 . . . t)
Case 1: If s1 = r1 and s2 δ
′ r2, let l < t be the smallest index such that : Σl(s2) ≥ Σt(r2).
Consider the matrix u = (ui,j) defined as follow:
ui,1 = si,1 = ri,1 ∀i = 1, ..., t
ui,2 = si,2 ∀i < l, ul,2 = Σt(r2)− Σl−1(s2), ui,2 = 0 ∀i > l
ui,3 = si,3 ∀i < l, ul,3 = nl − ul,1 − ul,2, ui,3 = ni − ui,1 ∀i > l
By construction, u ∈ Λ(W). Let U ∈ 3N/ ∼I such that u = Φ−1(U). By definition of u we
have : s2 δ
′ u2 (1); Σt(u2) = Σt(r2) (2); s δ u (3) and u δ r (4).
Since s1 = u1 = r1, there exist two maps f : N → N and g : N → N product of transpositions









3) : then f(R) ∼I R and g(U) ∼I U .




- If m = 0 then u2 = r2 and since u1 = r1, it then follow that u = r and hence U %I R.
- If m > 0 then, let k < t be the smallest index such that uk,2 > rk,2. From (4), we have
u1,2 = r1,2, ..., uk−1,2 = rk−1,2. Thanks to (2) there exist an index h > k such that uh,2 < rh,2.
Consider the smallest such index h : and let a ∈ (U2 ∩ Nk) \ R′2 and b ∈ (R′2 ∩ Nh) \ U2. Since




(ui,2 − r′i,2) = m − 1. We obtain by induction a sequence (π(1), π(2), π(3), . . . , π(m))
of transpositions of players of different classes such that π(m) ◦ π(m−1) ◦ · · · ◦ π(1)(R′2) = U2. Let
Γ = π(m) ◦ π(m−1) ◦ · · · ◦ π(1). Then Γ(R′2) = U2. Since Γ(f(R)) = Γ(U1, R′2, R′3) = (U1, U2,Γ(R′3)),
it follows that Γ(f(R)) = U and hence U %I f(R). Since f(R) ∼I R we deduce that U %I R.
• In order to prove that S %I U , we will proceed by induction on m = |U ′2 \ S2|.
Subscase 1 : If m = 0 then U ′2 ⊆ S2 and g(U) ⊆3 S, thus, S %I g(U).
Subscase 2 : If m > 0, then there exists a ∈ N : a ∈ U ′2 \ S2. With no loss of the generality,
let us assume that a ∈ (U ′2 \ S2) ∩ Ni. Since si,2 ≥ ui,2, there exists b ∈ (S2 \ U ′2) ∩ Ni. Thus,
a ≡I b, U ′′2 = πab(U ′2) satisfies (1) and |U ′′2 \ S2| = m − 1. We obtain by induction a sequence
(πab = π
(1), π(2), . . . , π(m)) of transpositions of equivalent players such that π(m) ◦ π(m−1) ◦ · · · ◦
π(1)(U ′2) ⊆ S2. By letting Γ′ = π(m) ◦ π(m−1) ◦ · · · ◦ π(1), we have Γ′(U ′2) ⊆ S2. It is straightforward
that Γ′(g(U)) ⊆3 S; hence S %I g(U). Since g(U) ∼I U we deduce that S %I U .
The case 1 is now complete, thanks to U %I R and S %I U , it follows that S %I R, which
means that S I R.
Case 2 : If s1 δ
′ r1, s1 6= r1 and (s1 + s2) δ′ (r1 + r2) . Again, let l < t be the smallest index
such that Σl(s1) ≥ Σt(r1). Consider the following matrix u = (ui,j) :
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
ui,1 = si,1 ∀i < l, ul,1 = Σt(r1)− Σl−1(s1) , ui,1 = 0 ∀i > l
ui,2 = ni − ui,1 − ui,3, ∀i = 1, ..., t
ui,3 = ri,3 ∀i = 1, ..., t
Once more, as u ∈ Λ(W), let U ∈ 3N/ ∼I such that u = Φ−1(U). We deduce from the definition
of u that : si,1 ≥ ui,1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t (1) ; Σt(u1) = Σt(r1) (2); Σi(s1 + s2) ≥ Σi(u1 + u2) ∀i =
1, 2, . . . , t (3); s δ u (4) u δ r (5). Recall that we want to prove that S  I U I R, that is,
S %I U %I R.
Since u3 = r3 there exists a mapping h : N → N , product of transpositions of equivalent players




2, U3) : then h(R) ∼I R.




By using a similar reasoning as in Case 1, and proceeding by induction on m, we obtain
U %I h(R). Now thanks to the fact that h(R) ∼I R, it follows that U %I R.
• Let us show that S %I U . For this purpose, let m = |U1 \ S1|.
Subcase 1 : If m = 0, then U1 ⊆ S1 because si,1 ≥ ui,1 ∀i = 1, . . . , t.






2 = U2\A, A = (S1\U1)∩U2, U ′3 = U3\B with B = (S1\U1)∩U3.
We then have U ⊆3 U ′ because U1 ⊆ S1 and U1 ∪ U2 = S1 ∪ U ′2. So, U ′ %I U (?). Now, it is
enough to show that S %I U ′. Since s1 = u′1 and Σt(u
′
2) ≤ Σt(u2), U ′ verifies (4) and hence
Σt(s2) ≥ Σt(u′2).
If Σt(s2) = Σt(u
′




(si,2 − u′i,2), we prove as above that
S %I U ′. In addition, if Σt(s2) > Σt(u′2), then there exists a mapping K1 : N → N product of
transpositions of equivalent players such that K1(U




3 ) where U
′′
2 satisfies (1). In
addition, U ′ ∼I K1(U ′) (??).
By induction on m′′ = |U ′′2 \ S2|, we prove identically that S %I K1(U ′) (? ? ?).
Now, thanks to (?), (??) and (? ? ?), we deduce that S %I U ′ %I U hence S %I U .
Subcase 2 : If m > 0, then by proceeding as we did in Subcase 2 of case 1, we prove the
existence of a mapping K2 : N → N product of transpositions of equivalent players such that
K2(U1) ⊆ S1. Let K2(U) = (K2(U1), U ′2, U ′3) : this meets the subcase just done above (m = 0)
by merely replacing U with K2(U). We can therefore use the same reasoning to conclude that
S %I U ′ ∼I U and hence S %I U . Finally, we obtain S %I U %I R. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1
From the inclusions Wsm ⊆ Wm ⊆ W , it follows that Wsm ⊆ Wm ⊆ W . Hence
Wm ⊆ Wm ⊆ W since Wsm =Wm. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2
We consider M as defined in the text.
1. This point comes from the fact that any mp belongs to Λ(W).
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2. If r > 1, let p 6= q. Then mp and mq are not δ-comparable : indeed, if (for example) mp δ mq,
then, Sq /∈ W
m
with mq = Φ(Sq) which is a contradiction.
3. (i) Assume that : t = r = 1. If the vector m1 = (0, 0, n) then (∅, ∅, N) would be a winning
tripartition, which is impossible.
(ii) Now assume that t > 1. If the condition [there exists some p such that (mpi,1 > 0 and
mpi+1,1 < ni+1) or (m
p
i,3 < ni and m
p
i+1,3 > 0)] is not true for some i < t, then any component
of the vector M should be one of the following four forms :
Form 1:
mp1,1 mp1,2 mp1,3mp2,1 mp2,2 mp2,3. . . . . . . . .
0 0 ni







































 mp1,1 mp1,2 mp1,3. . . . . . . . .0 0 ni
ni+1 0 0










mp1,1 mp1,2 mp1,3mp2,1 mp2,2 mp2,3. . . . . . . . .
ni+1 0 0









(a) • In the sequel, we will prove that in either form, for all a ∈ Ni and b ∈ Ni+1 we have
b ≥I a.
Let a ∈ Ni and b ∈ Ni+1. We will prove that b ≥D+ a, b ≥D− a and b ≥D± a.
The proof of b ≥D+ a
Let S ∈ 3N such that a, b ∈ S2 and (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) ∈ W . We need to prove that
(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W , that is, there exists p such that s′ = Φ(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) δ mp. Let
s = Φ(S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) : since (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) ∈ W , we have s δ mp for some p. In the
sequel we will prove that s′ δ mp.
• If mp is of Form 1, then s1 δ′ mp1 and s1 6= m
p
1 as si,1 > 0, Σh(s1) ≥ Σh(m
p




We claim that s′1 δ
′ mp1 : indeed, Σh(s1) = Σh(s
′
1) for all h < i, Σi(s
′
1) = Σi(s1) − 1, and
Σh(s
′













2) for all h 6= i and Σi(s′1 + s′2) =
Σi(s1 + s2)− 1 ≥ Σi(mp1 +m
p
2).
So, if s′1 6= m
p
1, then it follows that s
′ δ mp.
However, if it happens that s′1 = m
p
1, in order to conclude that s
′ δ mp, we will show that
s′2 δ
′ mp2.

























• If mp is of Form 2 or 3, the proof is quite similar to that of the case where mp is of
Form 1.
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• Ifmp is of Form 4, then s1 δ′ mp1 and s1 6= m
p
1 because s(i+1),1 < ni+1. Since s(i+1),1 < ni+1
and Σi+1(s1) ≥ Σi+1(mp1), it follows that Σi(s1) > Σi(m
p
1). Since s(i+1),1 < ni+1 and
Σi+1(s1) ≥ Σi+1(mp1), it follows that Σi(s1) > Σi(m
p
1). We can now proceed exactly as
in the first form to get s′ δ mp.
The proof of b ≥D± a : similar to the proof of b ≥D+ a
The proof of b ≥D− a
Let S ∈ 3N such that a, b ∈ S2 and (S1, S2 ∪ a, S3 \ a) ∈ W . We need to prove that
(S1, S2 ∪ b, S3 \ b) ∈ W , that is, there exists p such that s′ = Φ(S1, S2 ∪ b, S3 \ b) δ mp. Let
s = Φ(S1, S2 ∪ a, S3 \ a) : since (S1, S2 ∪ a, S3 \ a) ∈ W , we have s δ mp for some p. In the
sequel we will prove that s′ δ mp.
Since s δ mp, either [s1 δ
′ mp1, s1 6= m
p









• If mp is of Form 1, then Σh(s′1) = Σh(s1) ∀h, Σh(s2) = Σh(s′2) ∀h < i, Σi(s′2) = Σi(s2)−1
and Σh(s
′
2) = Σh(s2) for all h > i.
- If [s1 δ
′ mp1, s1 6= m
p






























- If [s1 = m
p
1 and s2 δ




1. We claim that s
′
2 δ
′ mp2 : Indeed, Σh(s
′
2) =




2) = Σh(s2) ≥ Σh(m
p
2)
∀h > i. It then follows that s′ δ mp.
• If mp is of Form 2
- If [s1 δ
′ mp1, s1 6= m
p





By proceeding as in the form 1, we get s′ δ mp.
- Assume that [s1 = m
p
1 and s2 δ
′ mp2]








If s2 = m
p
2 then s3 = m
p
3 and hence s(i+1),3 = 0 which is a contradiction since b ∈ S3 \ a. We




(i+1),2 = ni+1 −m
p
(i+1),1 = ni+1 − s(i+1),1 = s(i+1),2 +
s(i+1),3 > s(i+1),2 since s(i+1),3 > 0. It follows that From s2 δ
′ mp2 and s(i+1),2 < m
p
(i+1),2, we





2) = Σh(s2) ≥ Σh(m
p





2) = Σh(s2) ≥ Σh(m
p




• If mp is of Form 3 or 4, the proof is quite similar to that of the case where mp is of
Form1. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof of a)
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⇒) Let f : (N,W) → (N ′,W ′) be an isomorphism. Then the inverse map f−1 is also an isomor-
phism and that πf(a)f(b) = f ◦πab◦f−1 for all a, b ∈ N . It then follows that a ≥I b⇔ f(a) ≥I′ f(b);
that is f preserves the influence relation and hence it preserves individual and coalitional indif-
ference and coalitional dominance. Moreover, f induces a multilattice isomorphism f : (3N ;1
) → (3N ′;1) such that f(W) = W ′. The map φ : (Λ(W); δ) → (Λ(W ′); δ′) is an isomorphism
because φ = Φ′ ◦ f ◦Φ−1 is a product of isomorphisms. Both games have, therefore, a common set
of models of shift-minimal winning tripartitions. Since they are lexicographically ordered by rows,
we conclude that M =M′.
⇐) Assume that M =M′ : Let us prove that there exists an isomorphism
f : (N,W)→ (N ′,W ′). LetN1 = {k1, . . . , kn1}, N ′1 = {l1, . . . , ln1} andNi = {kn1+···+ni−1+1, . . . , kn1+···+ni},
N ′i = {ln1+···+ni−1+1, . . . , ln1+···+ni} for all i = 2, . . . , t. Let us consider the mapping :
f : N −→ N ′
kp 7−→ lp
It is obvious that f is bijective and f(Ni) = N
′
i ∀i = 1, . . . , t.
Assume that S ∈ W . If s = Φ(S), then s δ mp for some p. Let S ′ = f(S) and s′ = Φ′(S ′).
Given thatM =M′, mp is an element ofM′. Thanks to the equality s′ = s that comes from the
definition of f , it follows that s′ δ mp and S ′ ∈ W ′. Applying the same argument to f−1 it follows
that the implication f(S) ∈ W ′ ⇒ S ∈ W holds, thus, f is an isomorphism.
Proof of b)
Let M satisfying conditions of Theorem 4.2. We need to construct an I-complete (3, 2) game the
characteristic invariant of which is M. Let n = Σt(n) = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ nt,
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and N1, N2, . . . , Nt be the subsets of N formed, respectively, by n1, n2, . . . , nt, el-
ements (which may be chosen following the natural ordering). By theorem (4.2), none of these sub-
sets is empty. For each S ∈ 3N we define s = (si,j)j=1,2,3
i=1,...,t
where si,j = |Sj ∩Ni| ∀j = 1, 2, 3 and i =
1, . . . , t. LetW = {S ∈ 3N : s δ mp for some p}. We will prove that (N,W) is a (3, 2) I-complete
simple game whose characteristic invariant is M.
1. It is straightforward that (N,W) is a (3, 2) simple game.
2. We shall now prove that N1, N2, . . . , Nt are equivalence classes according to the relation ≡I
and they are linearly ordered (N1 > N2 > · · · > Nt).
• Let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., t}, a, b ∈ Ni and S ∈ 3N .
- Proof of b ≥D+ a. If a, b ∈ S2 such that (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) ∈ W then by considering s =
Φ(S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) and s′ = Φ(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3), we have s = s′. Since (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) ∈ W
we have, s δ mp for some p so that s′ δ mp. Hence (S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W and b ≥D+ a.
- We prove in the same way that b ≥D− a and b ≥D± a, thus b ≥I a. By the same arguments,
we obtain a ≥I b consequently a ≡I b.
• Now let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., t}, a ∈ Ni, b ∈ Ni+1 and S ∈ 3N . We will prove that a ≥I b and b  a.
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If a, b ∈ S2 such that (S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W then by considering s = Φ(S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3)
and s′ = Φ(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3), we have s δ s′ since s is an elementary positive shift of s′. With
(S1 ∪ b, S2 \ b, S3) ∈ W we have, s′ δ mp for some p. So, s δ mp. Hence (S1 ∪ a, S2 \ a, S3) ∈ W
and a ≥D+ b. Likewise, it can easily be checked that a ≥D− b and a ≥D± b which leads to a ≥I b.
• To prove that b I a, we use Theorem 4.2 (3(ii)) and take a tripartition S ∈ 3N whose model
is some matrix mp such that: (mpi,1 > 0 and (m
p
i+1,2 > 0 or m
p
i+1,3 > 0)) or
(mpi+1,3 > 0 and (m
p
i,1 > 0 or m
p
i,2 > 0)). This condition leads to the following three possible
cases. (mpi,1 > 0 and m
p
i+1,2 > 0) or (m
p
i,1 > 0 and m
p
i+1,3 > 0) or (m
p
i,2 > 0 and m
p
i+1,3 > 0).
Case 1 : If mpi,1 > 0 and m
p
i+1,2 > 0 then we can assume that a ∈ S1 and b ∈ S2. If r is the
model of πab(S) then we have m
p δ r and mp 6= r, since that mp is an elementary positive shift of
r with j′ = 1, j′′ = 2, i′ = i and i′′ = i+ 1. Hence, b D+ a and thus b I a.
Case 2 : If mpi,1 > 0 and m
p
i+1,3 > 0 then we can assume that a ∈ S1 and b ∈ S3. If r is the
model of πab(S) then we have m
p δ r and mp 6= r, since that mp is an elementary positive shift of
r with j′ = 1, j′′ = 3, i′ = i and i′′ = i+ 1. Hence b D± a and thus b I a.
Case 3 : If mpi,2 > 0 and m
p
i+1,3 > 0 then we can assume that a ∈ S2 and b ∈ S3. If r is the
model of πab(S) then we have m
p δ r and mp 6= r, since that mp is an elementary positive shift of
r with j′ = 2, j′′ = 3, i′ = i and i′′ = i+ 1. Hence, b D− a and thus b I a.
• Finally, Theorem 4.2.(3) and the definition of W guarantee that Wm contains exactly r
models that are m1,m2, . . . ,mr. The proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Let (N,W) be a I-complete (3, 2) game with m1, . . . ,mr being the shift-minimal winning models
and α1, . . . , αs the shift-maximal losing ones.
1) Suppose that (N,W) is a strongly weighted (3, 2) game. Then it is weighted and there exists
a vector w = (w1, w2, w3) where wi : N → R for each i together with a real number quota q such





wi(a) and w1(a) ≥ w2(a) ≥ w3(a)
for each a ∈ N . Given that the game is I-complete, let us suppose that players are ranked into t
(t ≥ 1) classes.
Now let S ∈ Wsm, T ∈ LδM (the set of all shift-maximal losing tripartitions) and let mp
and αq with p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} be the respective models of S and T . We have


























αqi · w(i). This yields
t∑
i=1
mpi · w(i) >
t∑
i=1





i ) · w(i) > 0.
2) Conversely, let us suppose that there exists a vector w = (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(t)) such that,






i ) · w(i) > 0 ∀p = 1, 2, . . . , r and ∀q = 1, 2, . . . , s.
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mi · w(i) ≥
t∑
i=1









w(i) ≥ q and hence (N,W) is a weighted (3, 2) game. Thus, (N,W) is strongly weighted since it
is well known from [9] that any weighted (3,2) game which is I-complete is strongly weighted. 
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Figure 1: Multilattice associated with Example 2.7.
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1 0 00 1 0
0 0 2

1 0 00 0 1
1 0 1

1 0 00 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 00 0 1
0 0 2
→
0 0 11 0 0
0 0 2
→
0 0 11 0 0
0 1 1

0 1 01 0 0
0 0 2

0 0 10 0 1
1 0 1
 0 0 10 0 1
1 1 0
→ →
0 0 10 1 0
1 0 1

0 1 00 0 1
1 0 1

0 0 10 1 0
1 1 0

0 0 11 0 0
0 2 0

1 0 00 0 1
0 2 0

1 0 00 1 0
0 1 1

0 1 01 0 0
0 1 1

0 1 00 0 1
1 1 0
→
0 1 00 1 0
1 0 1
 0 1 00 1 0
1 1 0





1 0 00 1 0
0 2 0





0 1 00 1 0
0 1 1

↑0 1 00 0 1
0 2 0
0 0 10 1 0
0 2 0





0 0 10 1 0
0 1 1
 0 1 00 0 1
0 1 1






0 1 00 0 1
0 0 2

↑0 0 10 1 0
0 0 2
0 0 10 0 1
0 1 1







0 0 10 0 1
2 0 0
 0 0 11 0 0
1 0 1





0 0 10 1 0
2 0 0

0 1 00 0 1
2 0 0
















↑ 1 0 00 0 1
1 1 0

1 0 00 1 0
1 0 1

1 0 00 1 0
1 1 0

1 0 01 0 0
0 0 2
 1 0 01 0 0
0 1 1




0 0 11 0 0
2 0 0
 1 0 00 0 1
2 0 0







0 1 01 0 0
2 0 0
 1 0 00 1 0
2 0 0
 1 0 01 0 0
1 1 0







Figure 2: Multilattice associated with Example 3.9.
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